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Abstract
We study the relationship between the cognitive load manipulation and strategic so-
phistication. The cognitive load manipulation is designed to reduce the subjects cognitive
resources that are available for deliberation on a choice. In our experiment, subjects are
placed under a high cognitive load (given a di¢ cult number to remember) or a low cogni-
tive load (given a number that is not di¢ cult to remember). Subsequently, the subjects
play a one-shot game then they are asked to recall the number. This procedure is repeated
for various games. We nd a nuanced and nonmonotonic relationship between cognitive
load and strategic sophistication. This relationship is consistent with two e¤ects. First,
subjects under a high cognitive load tend to exhibit behavior consistent with the reduced
ability to compute the optimal decision. Second, the cognitive load tends to a¤ect the
subjects perception of their relative standing in the distribution of the available cognitive
resources. The net result of these two opposing e¤ects depends on the strategic setting.
Our experiment provides evidence on the literature that examines the relationship between
measures of cognitive ability and strategic sophistication.
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1 Introduction
Models of strategic sophistication have greatly improved our understanding of play in games.1
These models posit that subjects exhibit heterogenous sophistication in their thinking of the
game. An open question relates to the origin of these strategic levels and whether they arise
from a fundamental trait of the subjects. A natural candidate for the source of the strategic
levels is the measured cognitive ability of the subject. This has prompted researchers to
investigate the relationship between measured cognitive ability and strategic sophistication.2
However, one di¢ culty in employing measures of cognitive ability is that subjects with
di¤erent cognitive ability are possibly also di¤erent in other ways. As such, it might not be
possible to distinguish between an alternate hypothesis that an unobserved characteristic is
responsible for the level of strategic sophistication, and cognitive ability is merely correlated
with this characteristic. Here, rather than measure cognitive ability, we manipulate the
cognitive resources available to the subject via cognitive load. Cognitive load experiments
often direct subjects to make a decision in one domain while simultaneously manipulating the
cognitive resources available to reect on the decision.
The cognitive load manipulation is designed to occupy a portion of the working memory
capacity of the subject. Working memory can be conceptualized as the cognitive resources
available to temporarily store information so that it can be used in decision making. Therefore,
working memory is instrumental in the execution of deliberative thought.3 Several studies
have found that measures of cognitive ability are positively related to measures of working
memory capacity.4 Further, reducing the available working memory of a subject via cognitive
load, reduces the cognitive resources available for deliberation, and can be regarded as similar
to the condition of having a diminished cognitive ability. Additionally, given the within-
1For instance, Stahl and Wilson (1994,1995), Nagel (1995), Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001),
Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006), Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004). See Crawford, Costa-Gomes, and Iriberri
(2013) for an updated overview of the eld.
2For instance, see Bayer and Renou (2012), Burnham et al. (2009), Brañas-Garza, Paz Espinosa, and
Rey-Biel (2011), Carpenter, Graham, and Wolf (2013), Devetag and Warglien (2003), Georganas, Healy, and
Weber (2013), and Gill and Prowse (2014).
3See Alloway and Alloway (2013).
4For instance, see Conway, Kane, and Engle (2003), Kane, Hambrick, and Conway (2005), Oberauer et
al. (2005), and Süßet al. (2002). See Burgess et al. (2011) and Cole et al. (2012) for recent advances in
understanding the neurological basis of this relationship.
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subject design of our experiment, we are able to observe the behavior of each of the subjects
in di¤erent cognitive load treatments. As a consequence, our results are not possibly driven
by unobserved characteristics that are only related to cognitive ability.5
We expected that the cognitive load manipulation would produce uniformly less strate-
gically sophisticated behavior. However, we nd a nuanced and nonmonotonic relationship
between cognitive load and strategic sophistication, yet our results are consistent with recent
advances in the literature. While much of the research on the source of strategic sophistication
focuses on measures of cognitive ability, recent research emphasizes the role of the perception
of the strategic sophistication of the opponent.6
In our experiment, we directed subjects to play various one-shot games while under a
cognitive load. In particular, they played ten 3  3 games, a variation of the 11   20 game
(Arad and Rubenstein, 2012), and a variation of the beauty contest game (Nagel, 1995). We
note that our version of the 11  20 game is relatively simple, the beauty contest is relatively
complicated, and the 3 3 games have various levels of complexity.
The subjects played these games under either a low or a high cognitive load. Subjects in the
low load were directed to commit a three digit binary number to memory and subjects under
a high load were directed to commit a nine digit binary number to memory. Subsequently,
the subjects were asked to recall the number. Further, some treatments also informed the
subjects of the load of their opponent.
Through a single manipulation of the available cognitive resources, we observe behavior
consistent with two e¤ects. First, subjects under a high cognitive load had di¢ culty making
the computations associated with optimal play. In this regard, high load subjects can be
considered to be less sophisticated than low load subjects. Second, subjects under a high
load behaved in a way that is consistent with the view that they were aware that they were
relatively disadvantaged in the distribution of available cognitive resources. Therefore, high
load subjects can be considered to be more sophisticated than low load subjects. We nd that
5Although we note that the research nds that the cognitive load manipulation is more e¤ective on subjects
with a higher measure of cognitive ability (Carpenter et al., 2013).
6For instance, see Agranov, Potamites, Schotter, and Tergiman (2012), Alaoui and Penta (2014), Palacios-
Huerta and Volij (2009), and Slonim (2005). On the other hand, de Sousa, Hollard, and Terracol (2013) nd
evidence that many subjects are not sensitive to the apparent sophistication of their opponents.
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the net result of these two opposing e¤ects depends on the strategic setting.
The e¤ect of the constrained ability to make calculations dominates the other e¤ect when,
in the relatively complicated beauty contest game, the high load subjects selected less strategic
actions. This is consistent with the view that the diminished ability of the high load subjects
to compute the optimal strategy in the relatively complicated game. We also see that the
ability to best respond to stated beliefs, a measure of the sophistication of their actions, and a
measure of the sophistication of the beliefs of their opponents actions of the high load subjects
in the 3 3 games are di¤erentially less sensitive to a measure of the complexity of the game.
These results are consistent with the view that the high load subjects were less strategically
sophisticated.
On the other hand, the e¤ect of the reduction in their perceived standing in the distribution
of available cognitive resources dominates the other e¤ect in our version of the 11  20 game,
which is relatively uncomplicated. Here, high load subjects selected a more strategic response,
consistent with the expectation that they were paired with a more cognitively able subject.
We also nd that high load subjects, better than low load subjects, conditioned their behavior
on the information regarding the load of their opponent. These results are consistent with the
view that high load subjects were more strategic than low load subjects.
Overall, we nd a nuanced and nonmonotonic relationship between available cognitive re-
sources and strategic sophistication. We hope that our ndings are helpful in the e¤orts to
improve models of strategic sophistication. One promising proposal is that subjects, given a
cognitive cost of computing higher levels of strategic reasoning, select a level of strategic rea-
soning (Alaoui and Penta, 2014). Consistent with this model, there is evidence that subjects
are found to respond to an increase in incentives and an increase in the perceived sophisti-
cation of their opponent by selecting a more sophisticated action.7 Our results suggest that
an increase in the cost of reasoning could increase the observed sophistication in some set-
tings. Our results also suggest that information could be regarded as an imperfect substitute
for reasoning, since high load subjects better condition on their information than low load
7Cubel and Sanchez-Pages (2014) study the gender di¤erences in the response to incentives in the beauty
contest.
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subjects.
1.1 Related literature
The economics literature increasingly regards the brain as an object worthy of study in that,
subject to its limitations and heterogeneity across subjects, it is the source of economic behav-
ior. This line of inquiry has investigated topics ranging from the e¤ects of sleep on strategic
behavior (Dickinson and McElroy, 2010, 2012), to optimal search patterns (Sanjurjo, 2014a,
2014b), to neurological studies of the brain during choice (Coricelli and Nagel, 2009, 2012), to
novel elicitation methods designed to measure the reasoning of subjects (Agranov, Caplin, and
Tergiman, 2014; Burchardi and Penczynski, 2014; Chen, Huang, and Wang, 2013; Crawford,
2008). In particular, there is a growing literature that investigates the relationship between
measured cognitive ability and economic preferences8 and the relationship between measured
cognitive ability and behavior in games.9 To the extent that subjects under a high cognitive
load are similar to the condition of having a low cognitive ability, our results provide evidence
on the relationship between cognitive ability and strategic sophistication.
There is an extensive literature on the cognitive load manipulation in nonstrategic settings.
The research nds that subjects under a high cognitive load are more impulsive and less
analytical (Hinson, Jameson, and Whitney, 2003), are more risk averse (Benjamin, Brown,
and Shapiro, 2013), are more impatient (Whitney, Rinehart, and Hinson, 2008; Benjamin,
Brown, and Shapiro, 2013), make more mistakes on a forecasting task (Rydval, 2011), exhibit
less self control (Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999; Ward and Mann, 2000, Mann and Ward, 2007),
fail to process available information (Gilbert, Pelham, and Krull, 1988; Swann et al., 1990),
perform worse on gambling tasks (Hinson, Jameson, and Whitney, 2002), perform worse on
8See Andersson et al. (2013), Beauchamp, Cesarini, and Johannesson (2011), Benjamin et al. (2013), Ben-
Ner, Kong, and Putterman (2004), Brañas-Garza, Guillen, and Lopez del Paso (2008), Branstätter and Güth
(2002), Burks et al. (2009), Chen et al. (2013), Cokely and Kelley (2009), Dohmen et al. (2010), Frederick
(2005), Millet and Dewitte (2007), and Oechssler, Roider, and Schmitz (2009). See Arruñada, Casari, and
Pancotto (2012) and Dittrich and Leipold (2014) for the relationship between measures of strategic behavior
and social preferences.
9See Ballinger et al. (2011), Baghestanian and Frey (2012), Bayer and Renou (2012), Brañas-Garza, Garcia-
Muñoz, and Hernan Gonzalez (2012), Brañas-Garza et al. (2011), Carpenter et al. (2013), Chen, Huang, and
Wang (2013), Gill and Prowse (2014), Grimm and Mengel (2012), Jones (2014), Jones (2008), Kiss, Rodriguez-
Lara, and Rosa-García (2014), Palacios-Huerta (2003), Proto, Rustichini, and Soanos (2014), Putterman,
Tyran, and Kamei (2011), Rydval (2011), Rydval and Ortmann (2004), and Schnusenberg and Gallo (2011).
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spatial judgment tasks (Allred, Crawford, Du¤y, and Smith, 2014), make di¤erent choices
in allocation decisions (Cornelissen, Dewitte, and Warlop, 2011; Schulz et al., 2014),10 have
di¤erent evaluations of the fairness of outcomes (van den Bos et al., 2006), have more di¢ culty
telling a lie (vant Veer, Stel, and van Beest, 2014), and exhibit choices that are more sensitive
to the visual salience of the object (Milosavljevic, Navalpakkam, Koch, and Rangel, 2012).11
This literature nds that the behavior under a cognitive load is consistent with the condition
that the subjects have fewer cognitive resources available for deliberative thought.
On the other hand, there does not exist many instances of studies of the strategic behavior
that employ the cognitive load manipulation. To our knowledge, Milinski and Wedekind
(1998), Roch et al. (2000), Cappelletti, Güth, and Ploner (2011), Buckert, Oechssler, and
Schwieren (2013), Du¤y and Smith (2014), and Carpenter, Graham, and Wolf (2013) are the
only such examples. We note that all but the last of these are not designed to investigate
models of strategic sophistication in one-shot games. For instance, Buckert, Oechssler, and
Schwieren (2013) nd that high load subjects in a repeated Cournout oligopoly game are more
likely to employ the imitation heuristic. Milinski and Wedekind (1998) nd that high load
subjects in the repeated prisoners dilemma game employ less complicated strategies than
low load subjects. Du¤y and Smith (2014) nd that low load subjects in a nitely repeated
multi-player prisoners dilemma game exhibit more defection near the end of play and they
are better able to condition their strategy on previous outcomes. However, these studies do
not lend themselves to the study of strategic sophistication, as the games are repeated and
the subjects receive feedback about the strategic outcomes.
In contrast to the other studies, Carpenter et al. (2013) induce a di¤erential cognitive load
in subjects then observe their strategic sophistication. The subjects played a sequential game
that can be solved by backwards induction. The subjects were also asked to provide both
actions and beliefs in the beauty contest game. The authors nd that subjects under a high
cognitive load are less strategic in that they are less able to perform backwards induction.
Additionally, the authors nd that high load subjects believe that their beauty contest oppo-
10Although Hauge et al. (2014) does not nd an e¤ect.
11Deck and Jahedi (2013) study several e¤ects at a time and nd that subjects under a cognitive load are
less patient, more risk averse, perform worse on arithmetic tasks, and are more prone to anchoring e¤ects.
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nents would select a higher number and the authors observe a larger deviation from the best
response to these beliefs. Our most comparable result is that we nd that high load subjects
are less strategic in that they select a higher number in the beauty contest. While our beauty
contest results coincide with those of Carpenter et al., we also nd that, depending on the
type of the game, high load subjects can be considered to be more sophisticated than low load
subjects.
We also note that there are methodological di¤erences between Carpenter et al. and
our paper. First, Carpenter et al. employs a between-subjects design, whereby subjects are
exclusively observed in a single cognitive load treatment. This design introduces possible
di¤erences in payments across treatments, since the memorization task was incentivized. By
contrast, we employ a within-subjects design, whereby each subject played some games under
a high load and other games under a low load. Therefore, the di¤erences that we observe are
not possibly driven by di¤erences in the payments across the cognitive load treatments.
Our paper contributes to the literature by providing evidence that the relationship between
strategic sophistication and available cognitive resources is nuanced and nonmonotonic. In
fact, this nuanced relationship is achieved through only a single cognitive load manipulation.
We view our results as providing indirect evidence that could inform the research on the
relationship between measures of cognitive ability and strategic sophistication. In particular,
our results suggest that a lower measure of cognitive ability will not necessarily produce less
sophisticated behavior, because the ability to make computations and the perception of the
relative standing in the ability to make computations have opposing e¤ects.
2 Method
A total of 308 subjects participated in the experiment. The subjects were drawn from the
experimental economics subject pool at Rutgers University-New Brunswick and the sessions
were conducted in the Wachtler Experimental Economics Laboratory. The experiment was
programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).12 Sessions lasted
12The z-Tree code is available from the corresponding author upon request.
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from 60 to 75 minutes.
2.1 Specication of the games
We directed subjects to play ten 3  3 games, an adaptation of the 11   20 game, and an
adaptation of the beauty contest game. These games were used because they provide di¤erent
estimates of the strategic sophistication of the subjects. The subjects were not given feedback
about the outcomes of the games. The subjects were told that they would be randomly and
anonymously rematched in each of the games.
First, we directed subjects to play 10 simultaneous action 3  3 games. These games are
simplied versions of games used by Costa-Gomes and Weizsacker (2008), Rey-Biel (2008),
and Bayer and Renou (2012). In these games, each subject was matched with another subject
and both made a selection among three possible actions. In addition to selecting an action,
we also elicited the point beliefs of the subjects about the action of the other player. Each of
the 3  3 games has an original version (labeled A) and a transposed version of the original
game (labeled B). In other words, the A and B versions are strategically equivalent but the
roles have been switched. From the perspective of the games as specied in the appendix,
subjects played all 10 games as either a row or a column player. Therefore, each subject
played both roles in each of the 5 strategically equivalent games. We note that the game was
always presented so that the subject was the row player and the opponent was the column
player. As a result, every player selected among actions labeled Top, Middle, and Bottom, and
selected beliefs about the action of the opponent that were labeled Left, Center, and Right.
Throughout the experiment, 10 points were equivalent to $3:50. Correct beliefs were rewarded
with 4 points.13
We also used a variant of the 11   20 game (Arad and Rubenstein, 2012). Subjects
were randomly matched with another subject and selected an integer between 1 and 10.
The subjects received the amount selected, where again 10 points were equivalent to $3:50.
However, the subject received a bonus of 10 points if they selected a number exactly one digit
lower than their opponent. Hereafter, we refer to this game as the 1   10 game.
13See the appendix for a screenshot from the 3 3 games.
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Finally, we employed a version of the beauty contest game (Nagel, 1995). Each subject
selected a half-integer between 0 and 10. The subject who selected the number closest to 2=3
of the average in the session received $30.
2.2 Memorization task
Before play in every game, the subjects were given up to 15 seconds to commit a number to
memory. The subjects were told that after the game, they would be asked for the number.
These numbers were always composed of a string of either 0 or 1, where the rst digit was
always 1. In the high load treatment, we required the memorization of a 9 digit string, for
example: 101110001. In the low load treatment, we required the memorization of a 3 digit
string, for example: 110. We employed a within-subject design whereby the subjects faced an
alternating load of high and low. Half of the subjects were given the high load rst, and half
were given the low load rst. A new number was randomly given in each of the games. The
subjects were not given feedback about the results of the memorization task.
2.3 Controlling for beliefs
Of the 308 subjects, 144 were given information about the load of their opponents in the 33
games and the 1 10 game.14 This took the form of a screen that stated that the other player
"will have to remember a: Big (Small) Number." Additionally, during the decision in the
33 games, the subjects were also reminded of the load of their opponent.15 In order to give
subjects a consistent sequence of stimuli, prior to the beauty contest game, these subjects were
shown a screen that stated that roughly 50% of the other subjects were given a big number
and roughly 50% were given a small number. In order to minimize the e¤ect of the load on
processing this information, the subjects were informed of the load of their opponent prior to
the memorization task.
14For studies that have controlled for or manipulated beliefs, see Agranov et al. (2014), Alaoui and Penta
(2014), de Sousa, Hollard, and Terracol (2013), Georganas, Healy, and Weber (2013), Palacios-Huerta and Volij
(2009), and Slonim (2005).
15See the appendix for a screen shot.
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2.4 Experimental timeline and details
Before the incentivized portion of the experiment, we provided four unincentivized tasks: two
practice memorization tasks and two simple addition tasks. First, the subjects were given two
unincentivized practice rounds with the memorization task, one with a large number and one
with a small number. Then, in order to illustrate the extent to which the loads can a¤ect the
ability to make basic computations, we provided a memorization number, then we directed
the subjects to sum two randomly selected integers between 11 and 40, then we asked for the
memorization number. The subjects performed this addition task under both a low and a
high cognitive load.
Subsequently, we provided the subjects with a basic understanding of 3 3 games.16 We
then directed the subjects to play the 3 3 games under a di¤erential cognitive load. Before
each of these games, we gave the subjects the memorization number, then we presented the
game, then we asked for the memorization number. The instructions stated that, should the
subject perform X of the 10 memorization tasks correctly in the 33 games then the computer
would randomly select the maximum of either 0 or X   7 outcomes of the 3  3 games for
payment.
Between each of the ten 3  3 games, the subjects were forced to take a 20 second rest.
During this rest period, the subjects were not able a¤ect the screen that read, "Rest!!! Because
a new game will start soon." Also, across sessions, we randomized the order in which the
subjects were presented the 3 3 games.
After the 3 3 games, the subjects were directed to play the 1  10 game and the beauty
contest game, under the alternating cognitive load that continued from the previous stages.
The subjects were told that they would be paid the amount of the 1 10 game and the beauty
contest game only if the memorization task was performed correctly for both of these games.
Note that we did not load the subjects when they were reading the instructions for the 1  10
game and the beauty contest game.
After the beauty contest memorization task was completed, the subjects were directed to
16These instructions are available from the corresponding author upon request.
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indicate their gender, whether they are an economics major, whether they have taken a game
theory course, an optional estimate of their grade point average (GPA), and a rating of the
di¢ culty in recalling the large and the small memorization numbers. These di¢ culty ratings
were solicited on a scale of 1 ("Very Di¢ cult") to 7 ("Not Very Di¢ cult"). Subsequently, the
subjects were told their amount earned and they were paid in cash. The subjects earned an
average of $17:67 (SD = 6:11).
2.5 Discussion of the experimental design
Despite that Du¤y and Smith (2014) nd that their cognitive load manipulation a¤ects be-
havior, here we employ a di¤erent design. First, we employ a within-subject design, rather
than a between-subject design. This is notable because research suggests that the e¤ects of
the cognitive load manipulation can be lasting (Dewitte et al., 2005). In order to mitigate the
e¤ects of the load of previous rounds, we employed a mandatory rest-period between games.
Second, unlike Du¤y and Smith (2014), which employs a memorization number composed of
digits ranging from 0 to 9, we restrict attention to numbers composed exclusively of either 0
or 1. This design was intended to mitigate the interaction between the game payo¤ numbers
and the the memorization task numbers.
While we could observe that subjects were not able to employ any obvious memorization
aids (cell phones, writing the number on paper, etc.) we cannot say with certainty that no
subject used a memorization aid. For instance, with an appropriate positioning of the free
body parts (feet, legs, elbows, wrists, and ngers on left hand) one could possibly devise a code
to aid memorization. In our view, this possibility is not as advantageous as it rst appears.
This is because the subject must also remember the code, and this will occupy cognitive
resources. Further, our results would only be strengthened if we could exclude subjects who
possibly employed a memorization aid.
Additionally, we designed the experiment so that the responses to the games were as simple
as possible. For instance, in the 3 3 games we elicited the point beliefs of the action of the
opponent rather than more sophisticated measures of beliefs. This procedure has a drawback
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that our measures of beliefs are coarse. On the other hand, the task is su¢ ciently simple so
that the memorization task was not likely to a¤ect the ability to comply with the elicitation
procedure. Additionally, we elicited responses to the beauty contest, which were the 21 half-
integers between 0 and 10 rather than, as is more standard, the integers or real numbers
between 0 and 100. More generally, we designed the experiment so that every response in
the games took a di¤erent format than that required for the memorization task. In the 3 3
games, the 1  10 game, and the beauty contest game, the responses involved clicking on the
corresponding button, whereas the memorization task required entering a sequence of digits.
Additionally, we do not load the subjects during the instructions of the 1  10 game and the
beauty contest game because this could reduce the comprehension of the instructions.17
We employed a simplied version of the 3 3 games originally used by Costa-Gomes and
Weizsacker (2008), Rey-Biel (2008), and Bayer and Renou (2012). The original games have
integer payo¤s that range from 10 to 98. We employed a simplied version where payo¤s
are integers that range from 1 to 11. This design was intended to reduce the computational
di¢ culty in deciding on an action.
We now discuss the equilibrium details of the games. The 3 3 games each have a single
pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. The 1  10 game does not have a pure strategy equilibrium,
but has a unique mixed strategy equilibrium. In equilibrium, the player selects 10 with
probability 0:1, 9 with probability 0:2, 8 with probability 0:3, and 7 with probability 0:4.
The beauty contest game has a Nash Equilibrium where every player selects 0.18 Although
the 1  10 game has a mixed strategy equilibrium, the beauty contest is a more complicated
game. First, there are several opponents in the beauty contest game, whereas there is only a
single opponent in the 1  10 game. Second, the best response in the 1  10 game is obvious:
select one fewer than your opponent. This is in contrast to the beauty contest where the best
response is less straightforward. Finally, there are many decision rules in the beauty contest:
the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium or successive elimination of dominated strategies. By
contrast, in the 1   10 game there is only a single decision rule: select one fewer than your
17We acknowledge that this design leaves open the possibility that the subject could decide on an action
during the instruction stage, thereby reducing the e¢ cacy of the cognitive load.
18Due to the discrete nature of the action space, there is another equilibrium where every player selects 0:5.
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opponent. This is because the game possesses neither a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium nor
a dominated strategy.
3 Results
3.1 A preliminary look at the cognitive load e¤ects
The subjects reported a signicant di¤erence in the di¢ culty in recalling the large number
(M = 5:93, SD = 1:23) and the small number (M = 6:83, SD = 0:52) according to a
Wilcoxon signed-rank test, W = 6798:5, p < 0:001. There are also signicant di¤erences
between the treatments in the length of time that they spent committing the number to
memory. Recall that the subjects were given up to 15 seconds in order to commit the number
to memory.19 The low load subjects had signicantly more of the 15 seconds remaining
(M = 12:80, SD = 2:96) than the high load subjects (M = 4:83, SD = 4:27), according to a
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test, Z = 46:70, p < 0:001. The subjects were each given
12 incentivized memorization tasks, 6 as high load and 6 as low load. Subjects in the low load
were correct in 99:03% (1830 of 1848) of the attempts and the subjects in the high load were
correct in 96:75% (1788 of 1848) of the attempts.20
Despite these di¤erences between the treatments, we do not nd evidence that the subjects
in the high load treatment were unusually impaired. Recall that we posed 2 simple, unincen-
tivized arithmetic questions to each subject, one under a high load and one under a low load.
Given 616 arithmetic questions, only 21 incorrect responses were given, 14 under the high load
and 7 under the low load. These are not signicantly di¤erent (2(1) = 2:42, p = 0:12). Thus,
we do not nd evidence that the high load signicantly impaired the subjects.
19The z-Tree output specied the time remaining when the Click to Proceed button was pressed. However,
there were instances where the output suggested that the decision was made with 99999 seconds remaining.
This output seems to have occurred if the Click to Proceedbutton was pressed before the clock could begin.
In the stage in which the number was given to the subjects, we recoded the 3 instances of the 99999 output as
16, because 15 seconds were allotted.
20According to a chi-square test, these are signicantly di¤erent, 2(1) = 23:10, p < 0:001
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3.2 The 3 3 games
Here we analyze the 3  3 games. We introduce the dependent variables that we will use
in order to characterize the strategic sophistication of the subjects in this setting. The rst
variable obtains a value of 1 if the subject played a best response to their stated beliefs and
a 0 otherwise. Second, in the strategic sophistication literature, L1 subjects are dened to
be those best responding to the least sophisticated L0 types. Typically in matrix games, the
L0 types are assumed to select each available action with an equal probability. In our 3  3
games, this would imply that the subject selects each action with probability 13 . Further, L2
types best respond to L1 types. Our second dependent variable, L2 classication, obtains a
value of 1 if the subject selected an action consistent with L2 behavior and a 0 otherwise. We
also ask whether the subject selected the action consistent with the Nash equilibrium. If the
subject selected this action, the Nash action variable obtains a value of 1 and a 0 otherwise.
The fourth variable, Nash beliefs, obtains a value of 1 if the subject reported the belief that
their opponent would play their Nash action and a 0 otherwise. The summary statistics for
these variables are presented in Table 1.
Table 1 Summary statistics for 3 3 games
Mean SD
Best response to stated beliefs 0:674 0:469
L2 classication 0:624 0:484
Nash action 0:572 0:495
Nash beliefs 0:511 0:500
The mean and standard deviation are reported for the dummy variables used in
our analysis of the 33 games. Each statistic is calculated from 3080 observations.
We now conduct a regression with the Best response to stated beliefs as the dependent
variable. Since the 3  3 games vary in their complexity, we include a two such measures.
One independent variable species the number of the subjects own dominated strategies.
This variable ranges from 0 to 2. Another independent variable species the number of the
dominated strategies of their opponent. This variable also ranges from 0 to 2.
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We account for the load by employing a high load dummy variable, which obtains a value
of 1 if the subject was under a high load and a 0 otherwise. Additionally, we include a dummy
variable indicating whether the subject had taken a game theory course, whether the subject
reported being an economics major, and whether the subject is female. We refer to this
collection of variables as Demographics. We also account for self-reported GPA. Recall that a
response to GPA was optional and only 216 of 308 subjects provided a response.
Additionally, we include controls for the information given to the subject. In particular,
we control for the case where the subject was not given any information about their opponent,
whether the subject was told that their opponent was under a high load, or whether the
subject was told that their opponent was under a low load. From this categorical variable, we
are able to determine the behavioral e¤ects of the information about the load of the opponent.
We can therefore estimate the di¤erence in behavior for subjects who were told that their
opponent was under a high load and those who were told that their opponent was under a
low load. We perform this di¤erence for three conditions: all subjects who were told the load
of their opponent, only high load subjects who were told the load of their opponent, and only
low load subjects who were told the load of their opponent. We present the estimates of these
di¤erences at the bottom of the summary of the analysis.
Since we have 10 observations for every subject, we employ a repeated measures analy-
sis. We estimate an exchangeable covariance matrix, clustered by subject. In other words,
we assume a unique correlation between any two observations involving a particular subject.
However, we assume that observations involving two di¤erent subjects are statistically in-
dependent. The regressions are estimated using Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE).
Since GEE is not a likelihood-based method, Akaikes Information Criterion is not available.
Therefore, we provide the Quasilikelihood information criterion (QIC).21 We summarize this
analysis in Table 2.
21For more on QIC, see Pan (2001).
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Table 2 Repeated measures regressions: Best response to stated beliefs
(1) (2) (3)
High load 0:0551 0:0622 0:0607
(0:187) (0:188) (0:226)
Own dominated strategies 0:487 0:492 0:563
(0:0704) (0:0709) (0:0881)
Other dominated strategies  0:0421  0:0432  0:0779
(0:0591) (0:0597) (0:0757)
High load*Own dominated strategies  0:167  0:169  0:231
(0:076) (0:0765) (0:0907)
High load*Other dominated strategies 0:0327 0:0339 0:0295
(0:0891) (0:0900) (0:114)
Self-reported GPA     0:307
(0:124)
Demographics No Y es Y es
Observations 3080 3080 2160
QIC 3812:39 3789:93 2639:42
Informed that opponent is high load minus  0:344  0:349  0:388
opponent is low load (0:117) (0:117) (0:136)
Informed that opponent is high load minus  0:370  0:383  0:404
opponent is low load for high load subjects (0:151) (0:153) (0:185)
Informed that opponent is high load minus  0:317  0:315  0:373
opponent is low load for low load subjects (0:178) (0:179) (0:203)
The repeated measures regressions estimate an exchangeable covariance ma-
trix, clustered by subject. We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts, the
individual demographics variables, or the covariance estimates. Regressions (1)
and (2) have 3080 observations (308 subjects in 10 periods) and regression (3) has
2160 observations (216 subjects in 10 periods). QIC refers to the Quasi-likelihood
information criterion. The bottom three terms provide the estimates of the dif-
ferences in behavior from being informed that the opponent was high load or low
load. Finally,  denotes signicance at p < 0:1,  at p < 0:05, and  at p < 0:01.
We nd that subjects were more likely to best respond to their stated beliefs if there was
a larger number of own dominated strategies. We also nd that the high load subjects were
less sensitive to the changes in the complexity of the game, as measured by the number of
their dominated strategies. Also note that we nd a positive relationship between GPA and
best responding to stated beliefs.
Additionally, we note that the e¤ect of the information of the load of the subjects is negative
and signicant for all three estimates in each specication. This implies that subjects were
less likely to best respond to their beliefs if they were told that the opponent was under a high
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load rather than if they were told that their opponent was under a low load. This is perhaps
a consequence of the subjects having less condence in their beliefs for high load rather than
low load opponents.
Next we explore the relationship between cognitive load and the L2 classication variable.
Other than the dependent variable, the analysis is identical to that summarized in Table 2
and is summarized in Table 3.
Table 3 Repeated measures regressions: L2 classication
(1) (2) (3)
High load  0:0075  0:0006  0:0614
(0:176) (0:177) (0:214)
Own dominated strategies 0:612 0:618 0:666
(0:0668) (0:0673) (0:0842)
Other dominated strategies 0:105 0:106 0:0427
(0:0591) (0:0596) (0:0741)
High load*Own dominated strategies  0:179  0:180  0:232
(0:0767) (0:0774) (0:0920)
High load*Other dominated strategies 0:0600 0:0608 0:121
(0:0837) (0:0845) (0:1080)
Self-reported GPA     0:217
(0:140)
Demographics No Y es Y es
Observations 3080 3080 2160
QIC 3905:04 3886:15 2718:96
Informed that opponent is high load minus  0:247  0:251  0:240
opponent is low load (0:105) (0:106) (0:121)
Informed that opponent is high load minus  0:289  0:300  0:337
opponent is low load for high load subjects (0:145) (0:145) (0:174)
Informed that opponent is high load minus  0:205  0:202  0:143
opponent is low load for low load subjects (0:159) (0:160) (0:188)
The repeated measures regressions estimate an exchangeable covariance ma-
trix, clustered by subject. We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts, the
individual demographics variables, or the covariance estimates. Regressions (1)
and (2) have 3080 observations (308 subjects in 10 periods) and regression (3) has
2160 observations (216 subjects in 10 periods). QIC refers to the Quasi-likelihood
information criterion. The bottom three terms provide the estimates of the dif-
ferences in behavior from being informed that the opponent was high load or low
load. Finally,  denotes signicance at p < 0:1,  at p < 0:05, and  at p < 0:01.
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For games that are less complex, as measured by the number of the subjectsown dom-
inated strategies, the subjects were more likely to select the L2 action. However, high load
subjects were less sensitive to the number of their own dominated strategies. Additionally, we
nd that high load subjects were less likely to play the L2 action if they were told that their
opponent was under a high load rather than a low load. On the other hand, the estimates for
the low load subjects are not signicant.22
Now rather than analyze actions, we analyze beliefs. Here we use the Nash beliefs variable
as the dependent variable. Other than the dependent variable, the analysis is identical to that
summarized in Tables 2 and 3. We summarize this analysis in Table 4.
Table 4 Repeated measures regressions: Nash beliefs
(1) (2) (3)
High load 0:258 0:265 0:237
(0:235) (0:236) (0:282)
Own dominated strategies 0:310 0:311 0:330
(0:0546) (0:0550) (0:0627)
Other dominated strategies 0:908 0:913 0:900
(0:0744) (0:0749) (0:0913)
High load*Own dominated strategies  0:198  0:199  0:217
(0:0838) (0:0843) (0:0983)
High load*Other dominated strategies 0:152 0:153 0:149
(0:0945) (0:0949) (0:1164)
Self-reported GPA     0:403
(0:148)
Demographics No Y es Y es
Observations 3080 3080 2160
QIC 3684:46 3677:35 2590:92
Informed that opponent is high load minus  0:082  0:086  0:186
opponent is low load (0:112) (0:112) (0:128)
Informed that opponent is high load minus  0:291  0:302  0:355
opponent is low load for high load subjects (0:153) (0:154) (0:193)
Informed that opponent is high load minus 0:127 0:129  0:0166
opponent is low load for low load subjects (0:168) (0:169) (0:192)
The repeated measures regressions estimate an exchangeable covariance ma-
trix, clustered by subject. We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts, the
22We note that the above analysis with Nash actions, rather than L2 classication, is qualitatively similar
to that presented above, however the estimates of the e¤ect of the information of the load of the opponent is
not signicant for either high or low load subjects.
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individual demographics variables, or the covariance estimates. Regressions (1)
and (2) have 3080 observations (308 subjects in 10 periods) and regression (3) has
2160 observations (216 subjects in 10 periods). QIC refers to the Quasi-likelihood
information criterion. The bottom three terms provide the estimates of the dif-
ferences in behavior from being informed that the opponent was high load or low
load. Finally,  denotes signicance at p < 0:1,  at p < 0:05, and  at p < 0:01.
As in the previous two analyses, we nd evidence that subjects were sensitive to the number
of their own dominated strategies and that high load subjects were di¤erentially insensitive
to this feature. Further, we nd evidence that high load subjects were less likely to express
Nash beliefs if their opponent was under a high load rather than under a low load. However,
we do not nd evidence of the analogous relationship for low load subjects.
We summarize our ndings from the 3  3 games. We nd that high load subjects were
less able to make computations as they were less sensitive than low load subjects to the
complexity of the game, as measured by the number of their own dominated strategies. This
lack of sensitivity was measured by the likelihood of best responding to their stated beliefs,
the likelihood of selecting the L2 action, and the likelihood of reporting the belief that their
opponent would play their Nash equilibrium action. In this regard, the high load subjects
were less sophisticated than low load subjects. On the other hand, we nd that high load
better conditioned their responses on the information about the load of their opponent. In
this regard, the high load subjects were more sophisticated than low load subjects.
3.3 The 1  10 game
Now we examine behavior in the 1   10 game. In Table 5, we present the distribution of
choices in our 1   10 game and that from the original 11   20 game (Arad and Rubinstein,
2012).
Table 5 Distribution of actions in 1-10 and 11-20 games
11  20 game , n = 108
Action 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
4% 0% 3% 6% 1% 6% 32% 30% 12% 6%
1  10 game, n = 308
Action 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1% 0% 1% 2% 2% 5% 12% 37% 21% 19%
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It would seem natural that the least sophisticated subject (L0) would select 10. The
subject who best responds to the L0 subjects (L1) would select 9. The subject who best
responds to L1 subjects (L2) would select 8, and so on. As such, the response is negatively
associated with the strategic sophistication of the subject.
Recall that in one condition, which we refer to as the No information condition, subjects
were not told the load of their opponent. In the other condition, which we refer to as the
Information condition, subjects were told the load of their opponent. As the response in the
1  10 game was bounded above at 10 and below at 1, we perform tobit regressions with the
action as the dependent variable, subject to these bounds.23 We include a dummy variable
indicating whether the 1   10 game was played under a high load. We also consider the
demographic variables and the self-reported GPA. In the rst two regressions, we restrict
attention to the No information condition. In the last two regressions, we restrict attention
to the Information condition. In the Information regressions, we include a dummy variable
indicating whether the subject was told that their opponent was under a high load, and the
interaction of this dummy with their own load. We summarize this analysis in Table 6.
Table 6 Tobit regressions: Choice in the 1  10 game
No information Information
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High load  0:631  0:526  0:606  0:767
(0:286) (0:308) (0:493) (0:604)
Self-reported GPA   0:210   0:610
(0:391) (0:561)
Told opponent high load     0:00985  0:195
(0:491) (0:611)
Told opponent high load*High load     0:570 0:872
(0:696) (0:867)
Demographics Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 164 112 144 104
-2 Log Likelihood 597:84 383:06 546:42 395:19
The tobit regressions are performed with an upper bound of 10 and a lower
bound of 1. We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts or the individual de-
23We run tobit regressions since 28 of the 164 subjects in the No information condition selected the upper
bound of 10 and 2 selected the lower bound of 1. Additionally, 29 of the 144 subjects in the Information
condition selected the upper bound and 1 selected the lower bound.
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mographics variables. Note that  indicates signicance at p < 0:1 and  indicates
signicance at p < 0:05.
We nd that in the sessions where the subjects were not given information about the load
of their opponent, high load subjects selected a more sophisticated response. However, we
cannot conclude that there is a relationship between the load and behavior in the Information
condition. We also note that the GPA variable is not signicant in either treatment. Also,
in the Information regressions, we do not nd evidence that the content of the information of
the load of the opponent a¤ected behavior.
Whereas Table 6 presents an analysis restricted to one of the two information conditions,
below we consider them together. As we did not nd evidence that information about the
opponents load was related to behavior, we do not include it in the analysis summarized
below. However, we do include a variable indicating whether the decision was made in the
Information condition or not. We summarize this analysis in Table 7 below.24
Table 7 Tobit regressions: Choice in the 1  10 game
(1) (2) (3)
High load  0:624  0:641  0:537
(0:305) (0:304) (0:363)
Self-reported GPA     0:411
(0:336)
Information condition  0:168  0:205  0:197
(0:316) (0:314) (0:362)
Information condition*High load 0:315 0:353 0:218
(0:446) (0:445) (0:520)
Demographics No Y es Y es
Observations 308 308 216
-2 Log Likelihood 1154:51 1148:44 789:02
The tobit regressions are performed with an upper bound of 10 and a lower
bound of 1. We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts or the individual de-
mographics variables. Note that  indicates signicance at p < 0:1 and  indicates
signicance at p < 0:05.
Again, we note that the GPA variable is not signicant. Additionally, the variables as-
sociated with the Information condition are not signicant. However, we nd evidence that
24We run tobit regressions because 57 of the 308 subjects selected the upper bound of 10 and 3 selected the
lower bound of 1.
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the subjects under a high load gave a lower response in the 1  10 game. To the extent that
lower responses are associated with a greater strategic sophistication, this is consistent with
the contention that the high load subjects were more strategic than low load subjects.
3.4 The beauty contest game
We now analyze behavior in the beauty contest game. Recall that lower responses in the
beauty contest are associated with greater strategic sophistication. Also recall that choice in
our beauty contest was the half-intergers between 0 and 10. We characterize the distribution
of actions in Figure 1.
<<Figure 1 here>>
We note that 33% of the subjects (101 of 308) played a dominated strategy of 7 or higher.
However, we note that the number of high load subjects who selected a dominated strategy
(52) is not di¤erent than the number of low load subjects who selected a dominated strategy
(49).25 Therefore we do not have evidence that the results that follow are driven by the
dominated strategies.
Because of the bounded nature of the action space, we run tobit regressions with choice in
the beauty contest as the dependent variable, subject to these bounds.26 In the information
condition for the beauty contest, the subjects were simply reminded of the distribution of the
loads within the session. As a result, for the Information condition regressions, we do not
include a variable indicating the load of their opponent. The analysis is otherwise equivalent
to that summarized in Table 6 and is summarized in Table 8.
25According to a chi-square test, 2(1) = 0:13, p = 0:72.
26Despite that in our sample, only 8 subjects selected the upper bound and none selected the lower bound,
we run tobit regressions. We do so in order to facilitate the comparision to the analysis of the 1  10 behavior.
Further, the tobit analysis is similar to that with an OLS specication. The OLS analysis is available from
the corresponding author upon request.
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Table 8 Tobit regressions: Choice in the beauty contest game
No information Information
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High load 0:625 0:933  0:716  0:762
(0:384) (0:432) (0:329) (0:382)
Self-reported GPA    2:076    0:0842
(0:547) (0:507)
Demographics Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 164 112 144 104
-2 Log Likelihood 742:74 490:19 600:92 431:48
The tobit regressions are performed with an upper bound of 10 and a lower
bound of 0. We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts or the individual
demographics variables. Note that  indicates signicance at p < 0:05, and 
indicates signicance at p < 0:01.
In regression (2) of the No Information regressions, the High load variable is positive and
signicant. This suggests that subjects in the No Information condition under the high load
were less strategic than subjects under a low load. We also note that the GPA variable in
the No Information regression is negative and signicant. Additionally, we nd evidence that
subjects in the Information condition under high load were more strategic than subjects under
a low load.
In order to get an overview of the data, as with Table 7, we run an analysis of the sessions
together. Therefore, we perform an analysis analogous to that presented in Table 7. We
summarize this analysis in Table 9.
Table 9 Tobit regressions: Choice in the beauty contest game
(1) (2) (3)
High load 0:655 0:644 0:788
(0:356) (0:357) (0:418)
Self-reported GPA      1:057
(0:387)
Information condition 0:354 0:328 0:267
(0:368) (0:368) (0:432)
Information condition*High load  1:316  1:321  1:467
(0:520) (0:520) (0:598)
Demographics No Y es Y es
Observations 308 308 216
-2 Log Likelihood 1366:33 1362:66 941:87
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The tobit regressions are performed with an upper bound of 10 and a lower
bound of 0. We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts or the individual
demographics variables. Note that  indicates signicance at p < 0:1,  indicates
signicance at p < 0:05, and  indicates signicance at p < 0:01.
First, we note that GPA is negative and signicant. This implies that higher GPA subjects
selected a more strategic response in the beauty contest game. Additionally, we note that high
load subjects selected a less sophisticated action than low load subjects. We also nd that high
load subjects in the Information condition were more strategic than were high load subjects
in the No Information sessions.27 This is consistent with view that the information about
the distribution of the cognitive load was used by the high load subjects but not by the low
load subjects. In other words, here again we nd evidence that high load subjects better used
information than the low load subjects.
4 Conclusion
We have described an experiment where subjects played di¤erent games while under a cognitive
load. These games included ten 3 3 games, the 1  10 game, and the beauty contest game.
Through our single cognitive load manipulation we observed a nuanced relationship between
available cognitive resources and strategic sophistication. This behavior is consistent with two
e¤ects. First, subjects under a high cognitive load had di¢ culty in making the computations
associated with optimal play. Second, subjects under a high load were aware that they were
relatively disadvantaged in the cognitive ability distribution. The net result of these opposing
e¤ects depended on the strategic setting.
We see the rst e¤ect dominating the second when, in the relatively complicated beauty
contest game, the high load subjects played less strategically.28 This behavior is consistent
with the diminished ability of subjects to compute the optimal strategy in this complicated
setting. Additionally, we see this e¤ect in that the subjects in the 3  3 games were less
27We run additional regressions that exclude the subjects that selected a dominated strategy (selected a 7
or higher). These results are robust to this specication and are available from the corresponding author upon
request.
28 In support of our contention that the beauty contest is more complicated than the 1  10 game, we note
that GPA is related to choice in the beauty contest but not in the 1  10 game.
24
sensitive to the complexity of the game, as measured by the number of their own dominated
strategies. We observe this di¤erential sensitivity in the likelihood of best responding to stated
beliefs, the likelihood of observing L2 behavior, and the likelihood of stating beliefs that their
opponent will play their Nash equilibrium action.
On the other hand, we see the second e¤ect dominating the rst when, in the relatively
uncomplicated 1   10 game, the subjects selected a more strategic response, expecting to be
paired with a more cognitively able subject. We also nd that in 33 games high load subjects,
better than low load subjects, conditioned their behavior on the load of their opponent. Also
in the beauty contest game, high load subjects who were reminded of the distribution of the
load of their opponents selected a more strategic action than the high load subjects who were
not reminded of the distribution. However, this relationship does not exist among low load
subjects. These results are consistent with the contention that high load subjects were more
strategic than low load subjects.
We hope that this research is helpful in suggesting improvements in existing models of
strategic sophistication. Our evidence suggests that constraints on cognitive resources can
a¤ect the computations involving optimal behavior and also in the perception of the subjects
relative standing in the distribution of cognitive resources. Our results suggest that a lower
measure of cognitive ability will not necessarily produce less sophisticated behavior, particu-
larly when the ability to make the necessary computations is not a binding constraint. Our
results also suggest that information could be regarded as an imperfect substitute for reason-
ing, since high load subjects better conditioned on information regarding their opponent. It
also seems that high load subjects were relatively sensitive to being reminded that they should
think through the game. For instance, providing obvious information about the distribution
of the load in the beauty contest game led to more sophisticated behavior among high, but
not low, load subjects.
Additionally, we hope that this research will encourage the use of the cognitive load ma-
nipulation in any setting in which cognition plays a crucial role in behavior. Perhaps the most
obvious application of cognitive load is in the rational inattention literature.29 Rational inat-
29See Sims (2003), Reis (2006), Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009), Wiederholt (2010), Bordalo, Gennaioli,
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tention models assume that decision makers are unable to process all available information,
however they optimally allocate their limited attention. It would seem protable to investigate
these models in the laboratory by manipulating the limits of attention via cognitive load.
We acknowledge that there is much work to be done on this topic. For instance, we were
not able to observe the order in which the subjects provided their actions and their beliefs.
In the future, it could be protable to observe if there is a relationship between the cognitive
load manipulation and the order of the selection of actions and beliefs. We also hope to learn
whether there is a di¤erential e¤ect of not soliciting beliefs. Perhaps the solicitation of beliefs
reminds the high load subjects to reect on the game, where that would possibly not occur if
beliefs were not solicited. We also do not know if a di¤erent means of controlling for beliefs
would lead to qualitatively similar behavior. Further, in our means of controlling for beliefs, we
also a¤ected higher order beliefs. A careful experimental setup could help distinguish between
the e¤ects of rst and higher order beliefs. Additionally, recall that Du¤y and Smith (2014)
found that low load subjects were better able to condition their play on previous outcomes,
however here we see that high load subjects are better using their information. Perhaps this is
due to the more complicated nature of information in the former. However, additional studies
are needed to address this possibility. Finally, we are interested to learn the implications of a
more di¢ cult high load (more than 9 binary digits) and a less di¢ cult low load (less than 3
binary digits) because it is not obvious to us that a monotonic relationship would emerge.
and Shleifer (2014), Dahremöller and Fels (2012), and Persson (2012). See Cheremukhin, Popova, and Tutino
(2014) for an experiment involving rational inattention.
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Figure 1: Number of subjects that selected each of the available actions in the beauty
contest game.
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Appendix
In the games below, 10 points are equivalent to $3:50. Games 1A and Game 1B: both players
have 2 dominated strategies. The game is adapted from Game 1 of Bayer and Renou (2012).
Game 1A
Left Center Right
Top 8; 4 5; 7 3; 6
Middle 6; 8 4; 9 1; 2
Bottom 7; 1 2; 5 2; 4
Game 1B
Left Center Right
Top 2; 8 3; 1 8; 7
Middle 6; 6 4; 3 9; 5
Bottom 5; 4 1; 1 7; 3
Games 2A and 2B: one player has a dominated strategy and the other player has two. The
game is adapted from Game 3 of Bayer and Renou (2012).
Game 2A
Left Center Right
Top 8; 8 3; 5 1; 9
Middle 9; 2 5; 3 6; 4
Bottom 4; 1 7; 6 2; 8
Game 2B
Left Center Right
Top 4; 5 6; 3 7; 7
Middle 3; 9 9; 8 2; 4
Bottom 5; 6 10; 1 9; 2
Games 3A and 3B: one player has two dominated strategies, the other player does not
have any dominated strategies. The game is adapted from Game VS1R of Rey-Biel (2008).
Game 3A
Left Center Right
Top 1; 9 2; 6 4; 3
Middle 4; 4 5; 4 5; 4
Bottom 7; 3 7; 5 6; 8
Game 3B
Left Center Right
Top 10; 2 2; 10 7; 11
Middle 7; 3 6; 4 7; 10
Bottom 6; 6 1; 7 9; 8
Games 4A and 4B: one player has one dominated strategy, other player does not have a
dominated strategy. The game, adapted from Game VS2R of Rey-Biel (2008), is dominance
solvable.
Game 4A
Left Center Right
Top 6; 6 4; 8 4; 9
Middle 4; 8 11; 3 3; 5
Bottom 1; 10 10; 6 3; 8
Game 4B
Left Center Right
Top 11; 1 1; 8 7; 5
Middle 4; 8 4; 8 1; 11
Bottom 6; 5 5; 7 2; 5
Games 5A and 5B: neither player has a dominated strategy. The game is adapted from
Game VSNDR of Rey-Biel (2008).
Game 5A
Left Center Right
Top 8; 6 2; 6 1; 11
Middle 4; 6 7; 6 3; 6
Bottom 2; 7 2; 5 4; 4
Game 5B
Left Center Right
Top 3; 10 5; 5 3; 9
Middle 4; 9 2; 9 4; 9
Bottom 9; 5 3; 8 2; 7
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Screen indicating the load of the opponent:
29
The screen during 3 3 games without information of the load of the opponent:
30
The screen during 3 3 games with information of the load of the opponent:
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